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JUSTICE BREYER: NO FRIEND TO IP LAW*
KEVIN E. NOONAN**
Justice Breyer’s recent decision to step down from the bench has produced
encomiums expected for a Justice of his tenure and standing. By all accounts, Justice
Breyer is a gracious, intelligent, and kind man with a playful nature seen in his
hypotheticals from the bench for which he has been well known.1 The eye Justice
Breyer cast on intellectual property law, on the other hand, was extremely skeptical
at best, and viewed through an antitrust lens that was against “monopolies.” Justice
Breyer’s recent decisions have had a more negative and sweeping effect that the
Justice may have intended, but the consequences remain and the rationale behind
them are of long standing in the Justice’s approach to patent law.
The Justice’s judicial prejudices in this regard are evident in his opinions
(speaking for the Court or on his own, in concurrences or dissent) and colloquies from
the bench. Justice Breyer’s colloquies have been known to be creative and occasionally
whimsical. For example, at oral argument in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,2 the Justice asked:
Suppose I discover that if I take aspirin, someone takes aspirin, I
discover they have to take aspirin for a headache, and, you know, I see
an amazing thing: If you look at a person's little finger, and you notice
the color, it shows the aspirin, you need a little more; unless it's a
different color, you need a little less. Now, I've discovered a law of
nature . . . and I may have spent millions on that. And I can't patent
that law of nature, but I say I didn't; I said apply it. I said look at his
little finger . . . Okay? Is that a good patent or isn’t it?3
Even making the unremarkable point that plants existing in nature are not patenteligible the Justice framed the statement in a similar fashion during the oral argument
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 4 the Justice said:
It's important to keep products of nature free of the restrictions that
patents there are, so when Captain Ferno goes to the Amazon and
discovers 50 new types of plants, saps and medicines, discovers them,

* Justice Breyer’s opinions, discussed herein, have invoked a fair degree of unnecessary rhetoric,
to which I have no desire to join or encourage. Accordingly, much of what follows are the Justice’s
own words, in oral argument and his opinions, for the majority and in dissent.
** © ORCID 0000-0003-0909-2928. Partner, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLC. The
views expressed herein are my own and not those of my partners at MBHB or our clients.
1 Although not always as intended, perhaps; See Kevin E. Noonan, The Fantastical World of
Justice Stephen Breyer, PATENT DOCS (April 28, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/04/thefantastical-world-of-justice-stephen-breyer.html.
2 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012) (No. 10-1150).
4 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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although that expedition was expensive, although nobody had found it
before, he can't get a patent on the thing itself. 5
But more often the Justice’s questions and hypotheticals evinced his underlying
antipathy for intellectual property protections. Justice Breyer succinctly enunciated
his philosophy regarding patenting (and his philosophical objections to it) in oral
argument in Bilski v. Kappos6 where he said:
There are actually four things in the patent law which everyone
accepts. There are two that are plus and two that are minus. And the
two that are plus is by giving people a monopoly, you get them to
produce more. As you said, you get them to disclose. The two minuses
are they charge a higher price, so people use the product less; and
moreover, the act of getting permissions and having to get permission
can really slow things down and destroy advance. So there’s a balance. 7
And this philosophy has led the Justice to develop a fine sense of when the “two
minuses” of patenting are predominant; for example, in Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
LLC v. Lee8 the Justice asserted:
[Y]ou could look at this new law as you [Cuozzo] were looking at it, as
trying to build a little court proceeding. If I thought it was just doing
that, I would say you were right. But there is another way to look at it.
And the other way to look at it . . . is that there are these things, for
better words, let's call them patent trolls, and that the -- the Patent
Office has been issuing billions of patents that shouldn't have been
issued -- I overstate -- but only some.9
And sometimes the prejudice is more pointed; in the Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse
Electronics, Inc.10 argument the Justice asserted, “[T]oday's patent world is not a
steam-engine world. We have decided to patent tens of thousands of software products
and similar things where hardly anyone knows what the patent's really about.” 11

5 Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Assoc. Molec. Pathol. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013) (No. 12-398). But to be fair, during the same argument Justice Kagan characterized the U.S.
PTO as being “patent happy” with reference to there being no unsettling of settled expectations at the
prospect of invalidating thousands of U.S. patents granted, and upheld in the courts, in the decades
before the Myriad case. Id. at 53.
6 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
7 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–20, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964).
8 579 U.S. 261 (2016).
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261 (2016) (No.
15-446). (The day after this oral argument, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued U.S. Patent
No. 9,326,435. While it is unlikely the Justice was unaware of this difference of three orders of
magnitude between the actual number of granted patents and his assertion, to the extent it was
intentional the Justice’s statement illustrates his thinking and prejudices).
10 579 U.S. 93 (2016).
11 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93 (2016)
(No. 14-1513) (emphasis added).
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And in Cuozzo:
I apply for a patent because I have this thing that instead of putting
red cellophane on the speedometer, I put purple cellophane on the
speedometer. It signals the presence of a hot dog stand. All right?
[Laughter] I -- I then try to patent it. And they look at this patent and,
no, absolutely not.12
The Justice’s motivations, with regard to his apparent animus against intellectual
property “monopolies,” seemed to focus on the economic costs to competitors and the
public, particularly for small businesses and also (as is seen in his more noteworthy
opinions, vide infra) in healthcare-related technologies. For example, again in Halo
Justice Breyer asserted:
A company that's a start-up, a small company, once it gets a letter
[notifying the recipient of an infringement allegation], cannot afford to
pay 10,000 to $100,000 for a letter from Counsel, and may be willing to
run its chances . . . And we are afraid that if we do not use this
objective standard, what we will see is a major effect discouraging
invention because of fear that if we try to invent, we'll get one of these
letters and we can't afford $100,000 for an opinion. 13
And in SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC:14
[A] patentee, after learning of a possible infringement in year 1, might
wait until year 10 or year 15 or year 20 to bring a lawsuit. And if he
wins, he can collect damages for the preceding six years of
infringement. This . . . gap [could permit an infringer (including an
unknowing infringer) to] invest[] heavily in the development of the
infringing product (of which the patentee's invention could be only a
small component), while evidence that the infringer might use to, say,
show the patent is invalid disappears with time.15
Then, and this would be particularly pernicious in circumstances where the infringer
is, “locked in,” when “business-related circumstances make it difficult or impossible
for the infringer to abandon its use of the patented invention.”16
Similarly, at oral argument in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,17 the
Justice posed this hypothetical:

12 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261 (2016) (No.
15-446).
13 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, 22–23, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93
(2016) (No. 14-1513).
14 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).
15 Id. at 968 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16 Id.
17 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
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I patent the following: [f]or a computer, enter somebody’s name; ask
[for a] phone number, and they’ll give you the phone number of you put
in the right city. That puts some lists in the computer. They can patent
that? Well, you add a couple of things, and then, apparently, you can
have an argument that they can patent it. Okay? Because it’ll be very
abstract language It will be able to patent almost anything . . . Patent
attorneys are very brilliant at figuring out just how to do this. 18
And with regard to deciding where to draw the line about when a lawsuit is objectively
baseless:
This vague line, no one knows what it is. In addition, all they did was
say, We don't want to go to court and cost you $2 million. Please send
us a check for $1,000, we'll license it for you. They do that to 40,000
people, and when somebody challenges it and goes to court, it costs
them about [$]2 million because every discovery in sight . . . No, no, but
I’m -- of course, it may be a small slice of litigation, but it is a slice that
costs a lot of people a lot of money . . . [and] I cannot in honesty say it's
frivolous given the standards for patenting that seem to be
administered . . . It's highly abstract language. I gather you, like I,
have read some of these claims. They are very hard to understand and
when you get to the bottom of it, the abstract nature of the language,
plus the fact that it has something to do with computer input, plus the
fact that, you know, you suspect very strongly it's baseless, but you
really don't like to say something that isn't true and you can say, well,
I could see how somebody might think there was something to this
claim, just in that tone of voice, which you can't write down that tone
of voice.19
And while the Justice’s opinion that patenting can be inimical to the practice of
medicine have been somewhat thoroughly set forth in his opinions, in this regard he
discussed an issue he considered “absolutely fundamental” in the oral argument in
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.:20
You have millions of doctors and scientists and computer people who
are working extremely hard to think of useful ideas and if you don't
give them an incentive, they may think of less . . . And they're all
useful. At the same time, if you patent all of their ideas, including very
useful mini-micro principle ideas, you will establish monopolies
throughout this country beyond belief and it will be difficult for people,
without paying vast amounts of money, to use their useful ideas. So

18 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 572 U.S.
545 (2014) (No. 12-1184) (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 33–36.
20 Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
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what principle do we use to separate the scientific idea which can't be
patented from the process which can be?21
Across several years and different cases having in common only patents as
their subject matter, the Justice’s questioning illustrated his underlying conviction
that patentees overreach in what they are claiming, extending into subject matter that
should not be patented as a policy matter, and were aided and abetted by patent
lawyers who are “brilliant” at writing and obtaining patents reciting claims that should
not have been granted. The Justice’s motivation is expressed either as sympathy for
small business owners unable to successfully litigate, or are not able to afford to, or for
patents involved in or affecting healthcare, either its provision or its costs, although
these concerns are more evident in the decisions the Justice has written as set forth
below.
While these snippets of the Justice’s colloquies from the bench are illustrative,
it has been the Justice’s opinions that of course have had the most lasting effects on
the patent system and American innovation. But there is at least some evidence that
those effects have not always been what the Justice may have intended. For example,
during the oral argument in Alice Corporation. V. CLS Bank International,22 in
response to counsel’s attribution for his argument on limiting subject matter eligibility
for the invention at bar, Justice Breyer said “you realize I couldn’t figure out much in
Prometheus to go beyond what I thought was an obvious case, leaving it up to you and
your colleagues to figure out how to go further.”23 And later, characterizing his opinion
in Mayo24 and, in his concurring opinion in Bilski v. Kappos,25 the Justice said that
those opinions “sketch[ed] an outer shell of the content, hoping that the experts, you
and the other lawyers and the . . . circuit court, could fill in a little better than we had
done the content of that shell.”26
While his decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.27 is best known (vide infra), other cases also illustrate the point. For example, in
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular
Systems, Inc.,28 regarding ownership of inventions made under the provisions of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the Justice writing in dissent posited the dichotomy that, on the one
hand, patents, “help to elicit useful inventions and research and . . . ensure public
disclosure of technological advances.”29 On the other hand, patents, “sometimes mean
unnecessarily high prices or restricted dissemination . . . [that] sometimes discourage
further innovation and competition by requiring costly searches for earlier, related

21 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548
U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607).
22 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
23 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (No.
13-298).
24 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
25 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
26 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (No.
13-298).
27 566 U.S. 66 (2011).
28 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
29 Id. at 795 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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patents or by tying up ideas, which, were they free, would more effectively spur
research and development.”30
To be fair, these concerns were raised in the context of the Justice being
reticent regarding permitting an inventor to assign an invention made using federal
funds to a third party, “thereby taking that invention out from under the Bayh-Dole
Act's restrictions, conditions, and allocation rules.”31 To do so would be “inconsistent
with the Act's basic purposes” and could “significantly undercut the Act's ability to
achieve its objectives . . . encourage[ing Federally funded institutions such as
universities] to commercialize inventions that otherwise might not realize their
potentially beneficial public use.”32 And these sentiments are consistent with the
scheme Congress enacted to support technology transfer of government-financed
research at universities. But this regime was directed towards changing the
government’s policy of not permitting (or at least not encouraging) patenting of
university research, something that should (in the Justices view) lead to the
deleterious consequences discussed above.
In the direct intellectual predecessor of the Mayo decision, Laboratory
Corporation of America v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,33 the Justice’s concerns about
healthcare-related patents and their effect on medical care was evident in his dissent
(joined by Justices Souter and Stevens) of the Court’s decision to dismiss the certiorari
writ as having been improvidently granted. In Justice Breyer’s view, the patent claim
at issue provided patentee with “control over doctors' efforts to use that correlation to
diagnose vitamin deficiencies in a patient. Does the law permit such protection or does
claim 13, in the circumstances, amount to an invalid effort to patent a ‘phenomenon of
nature’?”34 As a consequence, Justice Breyer believed that “aside from the unpatented
test, they embody only the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency
that the researchers uncovered. In my view, that correlation is an unpatentable
‘natural phenomenon,’ and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds anything more of
significance.”35 Justice Breyer’s views in this dissent set forth the same concerns that
would be voiced by the Justice five years later in Mayo.
These competing aspects of intellectual property protections in the law provide
a through-point to his thinking, which arose again in his Mayo decision:
Patent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the
promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to
creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very
exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might permit,
indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the
patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly
and time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent
Id.
Id. at 797–98.
32 Id.
33 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
34 Id. at 134 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Claim 13 of U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 recites: “A method for
detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:
‘assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of
total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.’” Id.
35 Id. at 137–38.
30
31
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applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing
arrangements.36
Thus turning, as we must, to Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc, these concerns converged, the Court considering a claim to a
diagnostic method that was easily if perhaps facilely characterized as claiming a
medical practitioner’s thoughts in making a medical diagnosis. The recognized
predicate to these concerns for Justice Breyer was in his dissent from the Court’s
decision dismiss its certiorari writ in Laboratory Corporation of America v. Metabolite
Laboratories as discussed above. There again the Justice showed an appreciation of
the necessary contours of any opinion limiting patent rights, saying: “monopolization
of [the basic tools of scientific and technological work] through the grant of a patent
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”37 But “too
broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law
[because] all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”38
Nevertheless, under the circumstances in the claims in Mayo, which Justice
Breyer writing for a unanimous Court characterized as merely reciting “three steps
[that] simply tell doctors to gather data from which they may draw an inference in
light of the correlations,” the Court saw a “danger that the grant of patents that tie up
[the use of a law of nature] will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger
that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction
to ‘apply the natural law,’ or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the
underlying discovery could reasonably justify.”39 Under these circumstances, the
Court’s calculus as stated in the opinion was that “[i]f a law of nature is not patentable,
then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional
features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”40
These principles are reasonable as far as they go and when limited to claims
like the Prometheus claims in Mayo, which, except for conventional methods for
administering a known drug and performing known tests to assess the amount of the
drug in a patient’s body over time, actually do recite nothing other than an
appreciation of the naturally occurring correlation. But in drawing the lines, or
providing the rubrics under which such lines should be drawn, the opinion claimed a
preeminence for Section 101 that served, as understood by most patent practitioners,
to undermine their doctrinal understanding of the statute. For example, in response
to the Solicitor General’s argument that the other Sections of the 1952 Patent Act were
a more appropriate measure of whether the claims at issue were patentable, as opposed
to patent-eligible, Justice Breyer’s opinion states that such an approach would make

36 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012); See also Kevin E.
Noonan,
A
Modest
Proposal
(or
Two),
PATENT
DOCS
(April
22,
2015),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/04/a-modest-proposal-or-two.html. This concept is also known as the
“Goldilocks” standard.
37 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 79–80, 86.
40 Id. at 77.
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Section 101 a “dead letter.”41 The Court’s holding did the most violence to the proper
application of Section 103, because by importing considerations of whether the
“additional steps” were “well-understood, routine, conventional activity,” these
considerations, hitherto the province of the obviousness analysis under Section 103 fell
into the ambit of Section 101. 42 This was not unintentional, the opinion stating that,
“a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the natural law itself.”43
The resulting subjectivity introduced into U.S. patent law seemingly undid
sixty years of jurisprudence Congress explicitly sanctioned by enacting the nonobviousness requirement into the statute. This is particularly ironic because Giles Rich
and P.J. Federico devised the concept of obviousness to counteract the subjectivity from
Supreme Court opinions that led Justice Jackson to remark that the only valid U.S.
patents were ones the Court had not had the opportunity to rule upon. And the culprits
for patents falling outside the Justice’s understanding of what should be patented
were, in his view, patent practitioners, the Justice stating in this opinion and citing
Parker v. Flook44, that the Court must beware of “interpreting patent statutes in ways
that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art’ without reference
to the ‘principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’”45
Thus, reciting in this opinion the mantra warning against patent attorneys as the
modern-day “artful dodgers” of patent law.
These sentiments, and their effects, must also be considered in light of an
apparent change in how the Court views its role, or at least the primacy of how policy
imperatives impact patent law and how they should be implemented. An example of
this change is a comparison between how Chief Justice Burger addressed the question
of whether “living things” are patent-eligible in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,46 where he
said in a 5-4 opinion:
Our task, rather, is the narrow one of determining what Congress
meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is done our powers
are exhausted. Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from
patent
protection
organisms
produced
by
genetic
engineering. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2181, exempting from patent
protection inventions “useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear
material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.” Or it may choose to
craft a statute specifically designed for such living things. But, until
Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language of
§ 101 as it is.47

Id. at 89.
Id. at 79–80.
43 Id. at 72.
44 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
45 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72.
46 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
47 Id. at 318.
41
42
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Justice Breyer writing for a unanimous Court, apparently addresses the issue now:
[W]e must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely
tailored rules where necessary. Cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (special rules
for plant patents). We need not determine here whether, from a policy
perspective, increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of
nature is desirable.48
Sadly, seemingly unrecognized by the Court is that Congress has addressed the issue
of patents impeding the practice of medicine, in enacting 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which
states:
(c)(1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of
this title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title
shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related
health care entity with respect to such medical activity. 49
There is some irony in Justice Breyer’s ascribing putative concerns about small
business as the origin of his decisions limiting patent eligibility, the Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. case providing a cogent case-in-point.50 The claims
at issue recited methods for detecting fetal abnormalities from maternal blood and
were invalidated by the District Court on patent eligibility grounds and this
determination was upheld by the Federal Circuit, which contained a “concurring”
opinion by Judge Linn agreeing with the outcome based on what he considered the
Supreme Court’s mandate in Mayo and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.51 Several members of the Federal Circuit have voiced the opinion that

Mayo, 566 U.S. at 92.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2022). The Court is eminently capable of appreciating its role in other
circumstances, see e.g., in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the Chief Justice,
writing in a 5-4 decision, stated:
48
49

Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a general
reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation's elected leaders. “Proper respect for a
coordinate branch of the government” requires that we strike down an Act of
Congress only if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is
clearly demonstrated.” Members of this Court are vested with the authority to
interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make
policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders,
who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to
protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.
Id. at 537–38 (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)).
50 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
51 Id. at 1373–74 (Linn, J., concurring) (“[O]nly because [he is] bound by the sweeping language
of the test set out in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.”); See Assoc. Molec.
Pathol. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Kevin E. Noonan, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom,
Inc.
(Fed.
Cir.
2015),
PATENT
DOCS
(June
22,
2015),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/06/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc-fed-cir-2015.html.
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“their hands are tied” by the Court’s recent pronouncements on patent eligibility.52 The
consequences of these decisions invalidating a patent, owned by just the type of small
business that Justice Breyer purports to be his concern, were that Sequenom was
acquired by Labcorp, a “global sciences leader in diagnostics” having 2020 revenues of
almost $14 billion.
And the fragmented nature of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in
interpreting the Court’s Mayo, Myriad, and Alice decisions has only worsened. In
Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services LLC,53 another case where the
Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s invalidation of claims on patent eligibility
grounds, the Court’s per curiam denial of rehearing en banc was accompanied by
opinions, concurring and dissenting, voicing sentiments that the Supreme Court’s
precedents mandated (at least to some extent) their decisions. For example, Judge
Lourie wrote:
If I could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to patent
eligibility, as respects natural laws, only claims directed to the natural
law itself, e.g., E=mc2, F=ma, Boyle's Law, Maxwell's Equations, etc. I
would not exclude uses or detection of natural laws. The laws of
anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and written description
provide other filters to determine what is patentable . . . But we do not
write here on a clean slate; we are bound by Supreme Court
precedent.54
Judge Newman, in dissent, enumerated the six decisions, at that time, where
the Federal Circuit affirmed district court decisions of patent-ineligibility based on this
view of the crabbed extent of the Federal Circuit’s ability to disagree with how the
Supreme Court’s eligibility jurisprudence was being applied. Judges Moore, now Chief
Judge of the Federal Circuit, in dissent and Judge Chen in concurrence agreed that
the Federal Circuit had applied the Supreme Court’s precedents too broadly, saying:
In the wake of Mayo, we have painted with a broad brush, suggesting
that improved diagnostic techniques are not patent eligible. Mayo did
not go so far, and given the import of diagnostic techniques, we should
reconsider this case and clarify our precedent. Because my colleagues
have declined to do so, there are no more options at this court for
diagnostic patents. My colleagues' refusal deflates the Amici's hopeful
suggestion that our precedent leaves the eligibility of a diagnostic
claim in front of the Federal Circuit “uncertain.” It is no longer
uncertain. Since Mayo, every diagnostic claim to come before this court
has been held ineligible. While we believe that such claims should be
eligible for patent protection, the majority of this court has definitively

52 Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d 1333, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
53 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
54 Id. at 1335 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so holding. No
need to waste resources with additional en banc requests.55
Nevertheless, but the Court’s steadfast refusal to grant certiorari has precluded any
correction. Judge O’Malley voiced a particularly strongly worded countervailing view,
saying in dissent:
I agree with all my dissenting colleagues that our precedent applies
the Supreme Court's holding in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) too broadly. I write
separately, however, because I believe that confusion and
disagreements over patent eligibility have been engendered by the fact
that the Supreme Court has ignored Congress's direction to the courts
to apply 35 U.S.C. sections 101, et seq (“Patent Act”) as
written. Specifically, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts
to read into Section 101 an “inventive concept” requirement—a baffling
standard that Congress removed when it amended the Patent Act in
1952. I encourage Congress to amend the Patent Act once more to
clarify that it meant what it said in 1952.56
To be fair, Justice Breyer’s antipathy for intellectual property law is not the
sole reason for the parlous state of IP protection in some industries, notably medical
diagnostics, and the threat the current state of the law raises against innovation in
these industries, as illustrated by Sequenom’s fate. Both the avidity with which district
courts have adopted patent eligibility challenges to invalidate patents and the Federal
Circuit’s reticence in distinguishing those cases from Supreme Court precedent have
played a role, and the Patent Office has promulgated sometimes conflicting guidance,
or they have been inconsistently applied in practice. But the Justice’s jurisprudence
certainly hasn’t helped, nor has the Court’s refusal to reconsider the effects of its
decisions in over 60 certiorari petitions, including in Sequenom, dismissed in the past
ten years. Justice Breyer’s opinions and attitudes have done much to create the
environment under which the current circumstances have arisen, and any honest
evaluation of his tenure and legacy on the Court must recognize this incontrovertible
fact.
Justice Breyer’s influence on the Court’s jurisprudence involving copyright
law, the other constitutionally enshrined intellectual property right, was less
impactful, likely due to the presence of Justice Ginsburg on the Court through most of
Justice Breyer’s tenure. He wrote in dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft,57 regarding whether
Congress could increase the term of copyright protection, and again in Petrella v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc,58 regarding whether laches could be used to defeat a
copyright claim, in both cases arguing for limiting copyright exclusivities. And last
year he wrote the Court’s decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.,59 expanding
Id. at 1363 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1371 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
57 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
58 572 U.S. 663 (2014).
59 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
55
56
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the scope of the “fair use” defense to infringement in computer programming
languages. These dissents and his Google decision were consistent with his general
attitudes regarding intellectual property.60
But one case in particular resonates with the Justice’s patent jurisprudence,61
and has a possibility of being equally disruptive: Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 62
In this case, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng, a student from Thailand studying in the U.S., for
importing copies of textbooks legally purchased abroad, but at a much lower price than
these books cost in the U.S.63 Although Wiley prevailed at the district court and before
the Second Circuit the Supreme Court reversed, in a 6-3 opinion by Justice Breyer.
The basis for the opinion was the Court’s interpretation of the language of the statute
regarding whether the “first sale” doctrine imposed any geographical limitations on
where the sale arose, which if it did not rendered Kirtsaeng’s importation lawful and
not an infringement.64 But its effect was to expand the scope of the first sale principle,
and copyright exhaustion, extraterritorially to activities outside the U.S.
While the decision is likely to affect copyright holders and their activities
abroad, including narrowing the scope of discount pricing in some markets, the
decision by analogy has the potential for a more pernicious effect in the patent realm
regarding reimportation of branded drugs. These drugs are often sold outside the U.S.
for less than the same drugs costs at home; at least some of these cost differences are
the result of foreign governments regulating the cost of branded drugs. This is not a
phenomenon limited to developing countries; European countries having a
nationalized health care system (i.e., all of them) also have varying levels of cost
controls for branded drugs, along with regimes for generic versions of these drugs after
expiration of some term of exclusivity for the branded versions. And many countries
such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Thailand have relied upon international
treaty provisions, such as the Doha Declaration under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization, to provide government-subsidized generic versions of branded drugs at
prices much lower than the prevailing price in Western countries. These differences in
costs have not affected U.S. prices because, unlike textbooks, branded drugs cannot be
reimported into the U.S. under FDA regulations and U.S. law.
But should that change, and changing the law has been a part of many propose
programs for reducing drug prices, the effects could be at best counter-productive.
60 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
61 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–36, Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189). Justice Breyer raised similar concerns regarding the effects of patent
law on traditional rules on alienation of chattels during oral argument:

But to go back to your basic point underlying this, of course, any monopolist,
including a patent monopolist, would love to be able to go to each buyer separately
and extract from each buyer and user the maximum amount he would pay for that
particular item. Dentists would pay more for gold perhaps than someone who wants
to use gold for some other thing. Okay? They'd like that. But by and large, that's
forbidden under many laws, even though it does mean slightly restricted output,
and it also means a lower profit for the monopolist.
Id.
62 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
63 Id. at 525–26.
64 Id. at 525.
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Paradoxically these efforts have been spurred on in the past by increase in generic
drug prices.65 If successful, these efforts could create a situation akin to the
consequences of the Kirtsaeng case in the copyright arena. Here, however, innovator
drug companies will not have the option, exercised by Wiley, of increasing prices
abroad to make reimportation less economically attractive. The prevalence of ANDA
litigation in the U.S. over the past thirty years is one indication of the importance of
exclusivity, and the attendant profits that result from exclusivity to pharmaceutical
innovation. Should those profits decrease significantly, the return on investment for
innovator drugs will fall, and the calculus of investment that supports new drug
development will be affected unpredictably, but not positively; the unpredictability
resides in how much the ROI will change and how that will affect investment decisions.
A common criticism aimed at branded drug makers is the frequency with which they
develop “me too” and next generation versions of already marketed drugs rather than
create innovative new treatments and therapies. The same uncertainties in drug
development that make such behavior sound economically also impact the decision to
develop new drugs, and policies that reduce ROI for such new drugs, which bear the
greatest economic risk, are unlikely to promote innovation.
Justice Breyer’s approach to intellectual property has been grounded in a type
of skepticism and mistrust that led Justice Jackson to assert that “the only patent that
is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.” 66 But Justice
Jackson also famously remarked that “[w]e [the Court] are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”67 Unfortunately that finality,
particularly with regard to opinions relying on Justice Breyer’s conception of the
proper scope of intellectual property protection, has resulted in IP protections that are
frequently not up to the task of promoting innovation. In an honest effort to balance
protection of IP with protection from IP, the Justice has, at least recently, promoted
policies that turned out to be contrary to the constitutional mandate to “Promote
Progress.” Which is at best an unhappy legacy.

65 See Kevin E. Noonan, How the Kirtsaeng Decision Could Ruin the U.S. Branded Drug Industry,
PATENT DOCS (November 25, 2014), https://www.patentdocs.org/2014/11/how-the-kirtsaeng-decisioncould-ruin-the-us-branded-drug-industry.html.
66 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 427 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).

